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WAITING TO EXHALE: HOW "BONG HITS 4
JESUS" REDUCES BREATHING SPACE FOR
STUDENT SPEAKERS & ALTERS THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON SCHOOLS'
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS AGAINST STUDENT
THREATS IN THE LIGHT OF MORSE V.
FREDERICK
INTRODUCTION
Since 1996, thirty-nine school shootings have occurred in the
United States, resulting in over one hundred deaths.' Due in part to
the large number of casualties involved in several of these shootings,
media coverage has been as intense as it has been ubiquitous.2 As
alarmingly tragic as these calamities have been, research
demonstrates that school violence in this country has steadily
declined since the early 1990s, when it peaked alongside other forms
of juvenile crime.3 According to experts, "the actual occurrence of
violent death in schools is much lower than the media portrays." 4 For
instance, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has
observed that "[a]lthough high-profile school shootings have
increased public concern for student safety, school-associated violent
deaths account for less than 1% of homicides among school-aged
children and youth."5
1. See A Timeline of Recent Worldwide Shootings, http://www.infoplease.com/ipalA0777958.html
(last visited Jan. 7, 2009).
2. See, e.g., Joe Volz, Media Distorts the Truth About Violence in School, 30 AM. PSYCHOL. ASS'N
MONITOR 9 (Oct. 1999), available at httpJ/www.apa.org/monitor/oct99/cf2.html (stating that "the sheer
number of media accounts about violence suggests the problem of school crime is much worse than it
is.").
3. DEwEY G. CORNELL, SCHOOL VIOLENCE: FEARS VERSUS FACTS 11, 29-31 (2006).
4. The National Center for Children Exposed to Violence, http://www.nccev.org/violence/
school.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2009).
5. CDC, Youth Violence Fact Sheet, http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/factsheets/yvfacts.htm (last visited
Jan. 7, 2009); See also CORNELL, supra note 3, at 16 (noting that news reports on school shootings
"seemed to confirm a radical change in the safety of all schools"; for example, "the cover of Newsweek
magazine (March 9, 1992) brazenly presented 'A report from America's classroom killing grounds.' The
use of hyperbole such as 'killing grounds' is an obvious attempt to reach a sensational conclusion.").
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GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
In the wake of high-profile shootings, (such as Columbine, and
more recently Virginia Tech), and the accompanying perception of
increased school violence, educators, administrators, and
policymakers have been re-assessing the scope of schools'
disciplinary authority to respond to students' conduct, writings, and
speech before they erupt in tragedy.6 For instance, following the
Virginia Tech shootings in April 2007, educators "across the country
have been wondering what they would [or could] have done if the
gunman, Seung-Hui Cho, had been writing troubling stories in their
classrooms." 7 Concomitantly, "[s]ome members of Congress want to
. .. [rewrite existing laws to] absolve college officials of liability if
they contact parents to discuss concerns about a dependent student, as
long as they consult[] first with a licensed mental-health
professional."8 Similarly, some state policymakers would like to
bolster educators' abilities to intervene by lessening the possibility
that such intervention would precipitate litigation by students.9 Most
relevantly, these concerns are not lost on courts, recognizing that
"[a]fter Columbine... and other school shootings, questions have
been asked about how teachers or administrators could have missed
telltale 'warning signs,' why something was not done earlier and
what should be done to prevent such tragedies from happening
again."'
10
To be sure, preventing school violence through proactive and
disciplinary measures is a legitimate and necessary enterprise for
school officials." Educational experts, however, have questioned the
efficacy of some of the preventative programs that have been
6. E.g., Joseph Berger, Deciding When Student Writing Crosses the Line, N.Y. TIMES, May 2,
2007, at B7; Elizabeth Bernstein, Delicate Balance: Colleges' Culture of Privacy Often Overshadows
Safety - Laws Allow Disclosure of Troubling Behavior But Many Schools Resist, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27,
2007, at Al; Michael Luo, Senators Discuss Preventing College Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2007, at
A17.
7. Berger, supra note 6, at B7.
8. Bernstein, supra note 6, at Al.
9. Alan Gaithright, Measure Would Protect School Staff, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 25, 2007,
at 24.
10. Lavine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2001).
11. See generally ROBERT A. FEIN ET AL., THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS: A GUIDE TO
MANAGING THREATENING SITUATIONS AND TO CREATING SAFE SCHOOL CLIMATES 64 (2002).
(Vol. 25:2
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WAITING TO EXHALE
proposed and enacted in recent years. 12 For example, researchers in
the field of education as well as policy groups have challenged as
ineffective (or at least over inclusive) "get tough" or "zero tolerance"
school policies that automatically punish a student, often quite
severely, for any infraction, regardless of ambient circumstances,
such as the student's intent.'3
In addition to arousing skepticism among education researchers,
new disciplinary measures have piqued the scrutiny of courts and
constitutional scholars because they raise important constitutional
questions. 14 In particular, those policies aimed at strengthening
schools' disciplinary abilities to preempt violence by punishing
violent speech lie in direct tension with students' First Amendment
free speech rights.
15
Examined broadly, this constitutional tension is not new.
Commentators have substantially chronicled federal courts'
approaches to the constitutional concerns over school disciplinary
policies as they interact with the First Amendment. 16 For instance, the
much heralded professor-practitioner Erwin Chemerinsky has traced
the manner in which First Amendment school discipline cases have
grappled with, followed, and generally chipped away at the seminal
case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,17 upon its thirtieth anniversary. 18 Others, perhaps more
forward looking, have questioned the extent to which the First
Amendment permits schools to discipline students for speech created
off-campus-in cyberspace, for instance. 19
12. E.g., CORNELL, supra note 3, at 164-65 (collecting criticism of "zero tolerance" policies in
schools for threat-related behavior including possessing a firearm on school property).
13. Id.
14. See generally David L. Hudson, Jr., Student Expression in the Age of Columbine: Securing
Safety and Protecting First Amendment Rights, 6 FIRsT REP. 2, Sept. 2005, available at
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/PDF/First.Report.student.speech.pdf.
15. Id. at 25-26.
16. See generally, e.g., Edward T. Ramey, Student Expression: The Legacy ofTinker in the Wake of
Columbine, 77 DENVER U. L. REV. 699 (2000).
17. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
18. See generally Erwin Chemerinksy, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the
Schoolhouse Gates: What's Left of Tinker?, 48 Drake L. Rev. 527 (2000).
19. E.g., Rita J. Verga, Policing Their Space: The First Amendment Parameters of School Discipline
of Student Cyberspeech, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 727, 728-29 (2007).
20081
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This Comment picks up where these commentaries (and others
similar to them) left off. Specifically, it seeks to provide a framework
of the legal principals at play in determining the constitutionality of
school disciplinary policies and actions.20 This Comment is made
timely not only by the most recent tragedy at Virginia Tech and the
disciplinary proposals it and other similar catastrophes have
generated, but also by the Supreme Court's most recent decision in
the student-speech area, Morse v. Frederick.2'
In Morse, the much-discussed "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" case, the
United States Supreme Court held that school officials may discipline
students for speech reasonably interpreted as advocating illegal drug
use.22 Although Morse did not concern student speech contemplating
violence, it augments schools' disciplinary authority, and in this
regard, Morse raises new questions about the outer limits of such
23
authority in other contexts. The constitutional confines with respect
to student threats are particularly implicated by Morse's holding due
to similar concerns for protecting the health and safety of
schoolchildren.24 Indeed, Morse has already been applied to such
cases in three Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal.25 In Boim v. Fulton
County School District, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a Georgia high
school student's ten-day suspension for a fictional story about a girl's
"dream" of shooting her teacher. 26 Also faced with a perceived threat
of violence, the Second Circuit, in Wisniewski v. Board of Education
of the Weedsport Central School District, upheld a New York high
school student's one-semester suspension for creating an AOL Instant
Message ("IM") icon of his teacher being shot.27 And most recently,
in Ponce v. Socorro Independent School District the Fifth Circuit
upheld a Texas high school student's three-day suspension and
20. See infra Parts I-IV.
21. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
22. Id. at 2620, 2622.
23. See generally id.
24. See id. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring).
25. Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978 (11 th Cir. 2007); Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch.
Dist., 508 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2007); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Central Sch. Dist., 494
F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
26. Boim, 494 F.3d at 985.
27. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36-37.
[Vol 25:2
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WAITING TO EXHALE
transference to an alternative education program for a fictional story
describing, inter alia, a mass school-shooting at his school.28
While achieving similar results, the circuit courts' divergent
applications of Morse indicate that the Supreme Court fell short of
providing much-needed guidance to educators and student speakers
to navigate the uncertain waters of its school speech jurisprudence. 29
While this Comment does not purport to still these waters, it attempts
to provide an up-to-date map of the operative legal principles that
would inform any school speech analysis.30 Additionally, this
Comment examines these principles in the context of student threats,
with any eye toward decision-makers drafting school policies,
litigants briefing courts, and judges adjudicating the constitutional
calculus involved therein.
3 1
Toward these ends, Part I of this Comment reviews the relevant
contextual history of school speech jurisprudence as it relates to
violent speech or threats of violence.32  Part II provides a
comprehensive discussion of Morse-including its facts, reasoning,
holding, concurrences, and dissent-and the ways in which Morse
further morphed the First Amendment standard for evaluating the
protectability of student speech in the context of threats of violence.
33
Part III traces Morse's already robust impact on the circuit courts'
analyses of student speech concerning threats of violence. 34 In
particular the Eleventh, Second, and Fifth Circuits' decisions in
Boim, Wisniewski, and Ponce are carefully explored for their
somewhat divergent applications of Morse and its relevance to
student speech in this context. 35 Part IV concludes by examining the
ways in which Morse suggests a two-step analysis of student free
28. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 766.
29. Compare Boim, 494 F.3d at 984 (extending Morse to speech reasonably interpreted as school
violence) and Ponce, 508 F.3d at 770 (extending Morse to threats of grave harm, deriving the gravity
from characteristics of the school environment), with Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38-39 (2d Cir. 2007) (not
directly applying Morse but expanding Tinker in the wake of Morse).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 37-138.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 155-241.
32. See infra Part I.
33. See infra Part II.
34. See infra Part HI.
35. See infra Part 11.
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GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
speech claims in the context of apparent threats of violence, thereby
reconfiguring the balance between students' constitutional rights and
schools' needs for preventing school violence.
36
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
To appreciate Morse, one must place it in the context of the
Court's student-speech jurisprudence. This Part provides a review of
this body of law beginning with Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,37 the "high-water mark of constitutional
protection for [students], 38 to Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser" and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier4° where the
Court somewhat retracted these protections in deference to the
schools' prerogatives. 41 While these cases, like Morse, do not
specifically address violent speech, they represent the legal
framework courts use to determine whether such student-speech
warrants constitutional protection.42 And although the details are
beyond the scope of this Comment, courts may also analyze student
threats under its "true threat" jurisprudence, first articulated in Watts
V. United States.43 A "true threat," as defined in the school context, is
a "serious expression of an intent to cause a present or future
harm." 44 But because schools are given broader authority to punish
36. See infra Part IV.
37. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
38. DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 193 (Foundation Press 2003) (1998).
39. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
40. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
41. FARBER, supra note 38, at 194.
42. See Hudson, supra note 14, at 3-8.
43. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). In Watts, an eighteen-year-old who had received a
draft card insisted at a public rally that he would not go and "if they ever make me carry a rifle the first
man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J." Id. at 707. Distinguishing the speaker's statement as political
hyperbole when considered in context, the Supreme Court established that nevertheless "true threats"
against the President do not enjoy First Amendment Protection. Id. For a comprehensive review of the
true speech doctrine in the school context, see Andrew P. Stanner, Note, Toward an Improved True
Threat Doctrine for Student Speakers, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 385 (2006).
44. Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Doe v. Pulaski
County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted); see also
United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1490-91 (1st Cir. 1997) (collecting and discussing the
differences among the circuits for determining a true threat).
[Vol. 25:2
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WAITING TO EXHALE
under student-speech precedent, many courts employ one of these
relevant standards rather than the Watts standard.45
A. Announcing Student Speech Rights at School: Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District
In mid-December 1965, several grade-school students wore black
armbands to school to peaceably protest the Vietnam War.46 School
officials heard about the students' intentions days before the
scheduled demonstration. 47 Fearing classroom disturbance would
ensue, they promulgated a regulation banning armbands. 48 In
knowing violation, the plaintiff students wore the armbands, but no
disruption occurred other than a few unfriendly remarks outside the
classroom. 49 Pursuant to the new regulation, the school officials
suspended the students; and their fathers subsequently filed a
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking injunctive relief and
nominal damages. 50
The school officials successfully argued to the lower courts that the
punishment was reasonable because it was rooted in their fear that the
armbands would lead to classroom disturbance. 5 1 In reversing, the
Supreme Court found that the school's "undifferentiated fear or
apprehendsion of disturbance [was] not enough to overcome the right
to freedom of expression." 52 Instead, the school had the burden of
showing "something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
45. See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Central Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d
Cir. 2007). See Andrew P. Stanner, Note, Toward An Improved True Threat Doctrine for Student
Speakers, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385 (2006) for a thorough discussion of the true threat doctrine in the
school context.
46. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
47. Id.
48. Id. The court noted that there had been great civil unrest and draft card burning incidents
sweeping occurring across the country. Because there were strong feelings both for and against the war,
the court believed the school's concerns and subsequent actions were reasonable. Id. at 504-05.
49. Id. at 508.
50. Id. at 504.
51. Id. at 504-05.
52. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
20081
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viewpoint." 53 According to the Tinker Court, that "something more"
was the requirement that schools provide concrete evidence that the
student speech would "substantially interfere with the work of the
school or impinge upon the rights of other students."
54
Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, articulated student-speech
rights for the first time by announcing that students do not "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate." 55 The Tinker Court, however, implied that these
rights could be somewhat limited because they must be "applied in
light of the special characteristics of the school environment .... 1956
Since Tinker, the Supreme Court has attempted to further define
the limitations of student speech given schools' special
characteristics. 57 While no Supreme Court case has specifically
addressed student threats under the First Amendment, Fraser,
Hazelwood, and most recently Morse have redefined the boundaries
of student speech, such that they now form the jurisprudential
backdrop for any school-threat analysis.
58
B. The Supreme Court Reins in Student Speech Protections.
1. Vulgar and Offensive Speech Is Deemed Not Protected Under
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.
Almost twenty years after Tinker, the Supreme Court reexamined
the limits of student-speech rights in the context of a sophomoric
sexual innuendo.59 On April 26, 1983, seventeen-year-old senior
53. Id. at 509. A regulation that only punishes one side of an issue is considered viewpoint
discrimination and is the most disfavored in the eyes of the Court. See, e.g., FARBER, supra note 38, at
21. Here, the Court was particularly sensitive to the likelihood of viewpoint discrimination because the
regulation was passed in response to learning about the protest, see Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504, and the
school's regulation did not prohibit students from wearing political campaign buttons and Iron Crosses
associated with Nazism. Id at 510.
54. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
55. Id. at 506.
56. Id.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 61-134. See Edgar Bittle, The Tinker Case: Reflections Thirty
Years Later, 48 DRAKE L. REv. 491 (2000) for a more thorough discussion of the underlying facts and
arguments proffered by both the school district and plaintiff students.
58. See Hudson, supra note 14, at 3-8.
59. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677-78 (1986).
[Vol. 25:2
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 442 2008-2009
442   I  I  .  
 ,,53 i  t ing  
 t     
t   i ll    
l i i   the rights of other students.,,54 
t   
i  d  
ti l i    
l se .,,55   
    t  t  lied i  
   r t ristics of the school environment .... ,,56 
r,     
 i    '  
i tics. 57   ll  
 t  t, ser, 
l ood,    ri s 
 ti l 
r    school-threat analysis. 58 
 t t tections. 
.  t cted  
  
 r,  i  
  i  
  , r- ld  
. .    r   
   ,    
 l  ti    i t ti    
   t ,   
it t   i n  
.  
r,   
. . t . 
. d. 
 i    e:   
 ,     l i  t   
r   l   
.  ,  t  , t - . 
l . . 
8
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 3
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss2/3
WAITING TO EXHALE
Matthew Fraser delivered a speech before a school assembly to
nominate his friend for a student-government position.60 Fraser's
speech, in its entirety quipped:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in
his shirt, his character is firm--but most of all, his belief in you,
the students of Bethel is firm. Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes
his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and
nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives
hard, pushing and pushing until finally-he succeeds. Jeff is a
man who will go to the very end-even the climax, for each and
every one of you. So vote for Jeff for ASB vice-president-he'll
never come between you and the best our high school can be.6'
The speech evoked a boisterous response from some students and a
select few made sexually explicit gestures; but, there were no
reported incidents of disruption other than one teacher devoting ten
minutes of her class time to discuss the speech.62 Therefore, both the
District Court and Ninth Circuit, applying Tinker, held that the school
officials had abridged Fraser's constitutional rights by "fail[ing] to
carry its burden of demonstrating that Fraser's use of sexual innuendo
in the nominating speech substantially disrupted or materially
interfered in any way with the educational process." 63 The Supreme
Court, reversed.64
In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the Court found Fraser's
sexually explicit speech distinguishable from the political speech in
Tinker.65 The Court preserved Tinker's protections, however, Fraser
announced that "the constitutional rights of students in public school
are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings." 66 Rather, the Court found that students' rights must be
60. Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1359-60.
63. Id. at 1359.
64. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 687 (1986).
65. Id. at 680.
66. Id. at 682.
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balanced against a school's need to "inculcate" students with
fundamental values of civility.6
7
Accordingly, the Court reasoned that Bethel School District per-
missibly disciplined Fraser because it "was entitled to 'disassociate
itself from the speech" in an effort to demonstrate that such vulgarity
is socially inappropriate.68 To reach this holding, the Court
emphasized that school officials, rather than judges, are best
positioned to determine what manner of speech is inappropriate.69
While Fraser specifically addressed vulgar and lewd speech, some
lower courts have upheld school punishment of threatening speech
under Fraser by finding that a school "need not tolerate student
speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic educational mission.', 7 ° The
educators in Morse successfully advanced a similar argument before
the district court that drug-promoting speech undermined the school's
anti-drug policy.71 However, Justice Alito's concurring opinion in
Morse's 5-4 decision made clear that "[t]he [controlling] opinion of
the court does not endorse.., school officials to censor any student
speech that interferes with a school's 'educational mission.' 72
2. School-Sponsored Speech Is Deemed Not Protected Under
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.
In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court further limited Tinker's scope
by supplying a separate constitutional standard for school-sponsored,
student speech.73 The case arose in St. Louis County, Missouri, when
the principal of Hazelwood School District withheld from publication
two pages of the school newspaper due to his concerns about two
articles.74 The principal objected to an article about teenage
67. Id. at 681.
68. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685-
86(1986)).
69. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
70. 70 See, e.g., Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 470 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266 (citation omitted)).
71. Frederick v. Morse, No. J 02-008 CV(JWS), 2003 WL 25274689, at *5 (D. Alaska May 29,
2003).
72. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2637 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).
73. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
74. Id. at 262-63.
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pregnancy because he believed the authors had insufficiently
protected the anonymity of the featured students.75 And due to
concerns of fairness, the principal disapproved of an article about
parental divorce because an identified father was not given an
opportunity to respond to disparaging remarks made by his
daughter.
7 6
The Supreme Court, in a 5-3 decision, upheld the school's
judgment to censor material from the school newspaper.77 The Court
distinguished Tinker which addressed a "student's personal
expression that happens to occur on the school premises" from
speech that "students, parents, and members of the public might
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school., 78 The
newspaper in question could be perceived as bearing the official
approval of the school because it was published in conjunction with a
journalism course and routinely submitted to the principal for
approval. 79 To ensure that the "views of the individual speaker are
not erroneously attributed to the school," the Court found that
educators must be given greater control over such school-sponsored
speech.8°
Accordingly, the Court held that "educators do not offend the First
Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content
of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns." 81 Applying this standard, the Court held that the principal
for the Hazelwood School District acted reasonably because his
concerns for protecting a source's anonymity and affording a person
the opportunity to respond to accusations were certainly legitimate
journalistic concerns. 82
75. Id. at 263.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 272-73.
78. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
79. Id. at 268--69.
80. Id. at 271.
81. Id. at273.
82. Id. at 274-75.
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II. "ToKE" FOUR: THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES ITS FOURTH
DECISION ON STUDENT SPEECH IN MORSE v. FREDERICK
In Morse v. Frederick, the Supreme Court held that a high school
principal did not violate the First Amendment when she censored and
punished a student for speech she reasonably interpreted as
promoting illegal drug use and which occurred during a school-
supervised event.8 3  Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the 5-4
majority, stated that placing such pro-drug speech outside the ambit
of constitutional protection is consistent with the principles
articulated in the Court's three-part, student-speech jurisprudence-
Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood.84 Specifically, the court reaffirmed
that, while "students do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,"85 such rights "are
not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings"8 6 and "must be applied in light of the special characteristics
of the school environment."
87
A. Facts and Procedural History
The opinion's references to the serious dangers of illegal drug use
by schoolchildren provide a sobering juxtaposition to the somewhat
amusing facts giving rise to the case. High school senior Joseph
Frederick ("Frederick") was seeking fifteen minutes of fame when he
hatched a plan to get on national television. 88 It worked.
83. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618,2622 (2007). This case is the most important student-speech
case to reach the Supreme Court in almost twenty years and is "the first time the court has said that
schools can prohibit a student expression that was neither obscene nor published under the school's
auspices." Charles Lane, Court Backs School on Speech Curbs: A 5-4 Majority Cites Perils of Illegal
Drugs In Case of the 'Bong Hits 4 Jesus 'Banner, WASH. POST, June 26,2007, at A06.
84. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
85. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (internal
quotations omitted)).
86. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)
(internal quotations omitted)).
87. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266
(1988) (internal quotations omitted)).
88. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618,2624 (2007).
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It was January 24, 2002, and Juneau-Douglas High School
("JDHS") principal Deborah Morse ("Morse") had decided to release
students from class to watch the Olympic Torch pass through Juneau,
Alaska en route to the winter games in Salt Lake City, Utah. 9
Students and teachers gathered on either side of the street while the
cheerleaders and marching band performed. 90 Frederick had not
arrived at school that morning because his car was stuck in the snow,
but he dug it out in time to meet his friends on the public sidewalk
across from JDHS.91 As the torchbearers and national television
cameras passed by, Frederick and his friends unfurled a 14-foot
banner reading "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.
92
Immediately upon seeing the banner, Morse crossed the street and
demanded the students take down the banner.93 Frederick refused and
asked, "What about the Bill of Rights and freedom of speech?,
94
Morse responded that the banner violated the school policy against
displaying material promoting illegal drug use, confiscated the
banner, and sent Frederick to her office where she suspended him for
ten days.9
5
At trial, Morse successfully argued that under Fraser, she had the
authority to censor Frederick's pro-drug message because it "under-
mine[d] the school's basic educational mission" to teach drug
abstention and it exceeded the boundaries of socially appropriate
behavior.96 The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that Tinker controlled,
not Fraser.97  The Court reasoned that broadening educators'
89. Id. at 2622.
90. Id. at 2624.
91. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006).
92. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
93. Id.
94. Morse, 439 F.3d at 1116.
95. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622-23 (2007). Frederick claims Morse increased his
suspension from five to ten days for quoting "Thomas Jefferson on freedom of expression." Frederick v.
Morse, No. J:02-008 CV, 2003 WL 25274689, at * 1 (D. Alaska May 27, 2003). However, Principal
Morse disputes hearing the Jefferson quote and denies this was the reason for the ten-day suspension.
Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Robert Barnes, Justices to Hear
Landmark Free-Speech Case: Defiant Message Spurs Most Significant Student 1st Amendment Test in
Decades, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2007, at A03.
96. Frederick v. Morse, No. J:02-008 CV(JWS), 2003 WL 25274689, at *5 (D. Alaska May 29,
2003) (slip copy).
97. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2006).
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authority to punish any message deemed inconsistent with its self-
defined mission would eviscerate Tinker's bedrock principle that
students do not shed their speech rights at school. 98 Applying Tinker
and finding no substantial disruption, the Ninth Circuit held that the
school's punishment violated Frederick's free speech rights.99
B. The Majority Opinion
On June 24, 2007, the Supreme Court upheld Frederick's
suspension, reversing the Ninth Circuit and creating another
exception to the student-speech protections announced under
Tinker.100 But before deciding what constitutional standard would
apply, the Court had to first resolve two issues: the meaning of the
banner and whether it constituted student speech.' 0
Acknowledging the existence of "uncertainty at the outer
boundaries as to when courts should apply school-speech
precedents," the Court nevertheless found that the facts of the case
fell well within those bounds. 102 Although Frederick was on public
property and at a public event, Chief Justice Roberts agreed with the
superintendent that Frederick could not "stand in the midst of his
fellow students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity
and claim he is not at school."'
'0 3
Finding the message properly analyzed under school-speech
precedent was rather uncontroversial; 10 4 however, the Court was
98. Id. at 1120. The Ninth Circuit expressly declined to follow the Sixth Circuit's recent
interpretation of Fraser as giving schools broad authority to punish any speech deemed inappropriate by
the school. Id. at 1122.
99. Id. at 1123.
100. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion of the court,
and was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Additionally, Justice Alito wrote a
concurring opinion joined by Justice Kennedy; Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion; Justice
Breyer concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part; and Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting
opinion and was joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg. Id. at 2621.
101. Id.at2624-25.
102. Id. at 2624. Chief Justice Roberts cited Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board as an example
of a case improperly analyzed as school speech. Id. In Porter, the Fifth Circuit declined to analyze a
drawing "completed in [student's] home, stored for two years" and inadvertently brought to school by
his younger brother as school speech. 393 F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir. 2004).
103. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
104. Id. (noting that every authority addressing the issue -- superintendent, school board, District
Court, and Ninth Circuit-found that Frederick's speech was properly analyzed as school-speech).
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sharply divided over the proper interpretation of "BONG HiTS 4
JESUS."1 °5 The dissent found the banner to be "an obscure message
with a drug theme" that was unreasonably interpreted as advocating
drug use. 106 The majority found that although Frederick's proffered
explanation of the phrase as simply "meaningless and funny" was
certainly a possible interpretation, it was not the only one. 10 7 And it
was not the relevant one in the eyes of the majority. The Court,
instead, deferred to Principal Morse's interpretation that the message
was "advocating or promoting illegal drug use" because it was
"plainly a reasonable one."' 0 8 The Court adjudged the reasonableness
of Morse's interpretation by finding at least two readings that the sign
advocated illegal drug use: either commanding "[Take] bong hits ..."
or celebrating "bong hits [are a good thing]. ' '109 Additionally, the
majority emphasized "this is plainly not a case about political debate
over the criminalization of drug use or possession," contrary to the
suggestions of both the dissent and the Ninth Circuit.1 10
It was against this backdrop that the Court held 5-4 that Morse's
actions did not violate the First Amendment."' The Court, in its
analysis, laid a foundation for another Tinker exception by first
105. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2625, 2646 (2007); see also Frederick v. Morse, No.
J:02-008 CV(JWS), 2003 WL 25274689, at *5 (D. Alaska May 29, 2003) (District Court finding the
banner promoted drug use and was properly analyzed under Fraser); Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114,
1121 (9th Cir. 2006) (in reversing the District Court, the Ninth Circuit found the banner to communicate
a political message and therefore was properly analyzed under Tinker's more protective standard).
106. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2646.
107. Id. at 2625.
108. Id. at 2624-25 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
109. Id. at 2625 (alterations in the original); see Dahlia Lithwick, The Breakfast Table: An E-mail
Conversation About the News of the Day, SLATE, June 25, 2007,
http://www.slate.com/id/2168856/entry/2169029/ ("Roberts goes to great lengths to insert meaning into
the silliness of the words on the student banner.... When did we enter into the era of constitutional
interpretation through inserting pretend wordsT').
I 10. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2625 (2007). The Ninth Circuit found "it is not so easy to
distinguish speech about marijuana from political speech in the context of a state where referenda
regarding marijuana legalization repeatedly occur and a controversial state court decision on the topic
had recently issued." Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2006). In her online column,
Julie Hilden argued that the court contradicts itself by finding both that the banner advocated illegal drug
use and that the banner fell outside political debate. Julie Hilden, The Supreme Court's "Bong Hits 4
Jesus " First Amendment Decision: How Its Betrayal of Free Speech Principles May Have Influenced A
Recent Federal Appellate Decision, FINDLAW, Jul. 9, 2007, http.//writ.lp.findlaw.com/hilden/
20070709.html.
11!. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2625.
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GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
underscoring two principles derived from Fraser and Hazelwood: (1)
students do not enjoy the same rights at school as they do elsewhere;
(2) and, the Tinker standard is not the sole means for restricting
student speech. 112 The Court then advanced the argument that
deterring drug use among schoolchildren is a compelling
governmental interest, evinced by Congressional policies tying
school funding to drug prevention programs. 1 13 Thus, given the
"special characteristics of the school environment," including peer
pressure, and the special dangers of drug abuse extending beyond an
"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance," Morse
permissibly punished Frederick for speech she reasonably believed to
advocate drug use. 114 In support of its analysis, the Court cited its
recent decisions in the Fourth Amendment context where it upheld
mandatory drug testing in schools due to a compelling interest in
deterring drug use by schoolchildren." 15
Chief Justice Roberts expressly declined to expand Fraser's
"plainly offensive" standard to encompass speech that the school
deemed violative of their educational mission.' 16 The Court,
however, proceeded to parrot the Fraser rationale-that schools must
disassociate from lewd speech to teach civility-by concluding that
educators may punish pro-drug speech because "failing to act would
send a powerful message to the students ... about how serious the
school was about the dangers of illegal drug use." 117
C. The Concurring Opinions
The concurring opinion authored by Justice Alito, and joined by
Justice Kennedy, is the most important because it aimed to limit the
112. Id. at 2626-27.
113. Id. at 2628.
114. Id. at 2629 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 508
(1969) (internal quotations omitted)).
115. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2627-28 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56
(1995)).
116. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618,2629 (2007).
117. Id.
[Vol. 25:2
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 450 2008-2009
450 I     
i  raser l d: ) 
t t      
 ,   
t t . I   t    
t rri      
r t l i t t,    
l i     I J3  
"special characteristics of the school environ ent," i l i   
ress re,  t  s i l r       
"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance,"  
r i i l  i  i      
t   .   
r t i i  i  t  t  t t  
t ry r  t ti  i  l   i  t  
i  drug use by schoolchildren. I 15 
i f ti  t     ser's 
" lai l  ffe si e" st r  t    t t  l 
   l 1   
r, r  t  t t  ser t at   
is ss i te fr  l   t  t   i   
t rs  i     iling l  
s   rf l  t  t  t t  . . .  s  
l s about the dangers of illegal drug use.,,117 
.  rring i ns 
 rri  i i  t     i   
ti  ,      
. ld. t . 
. ld. t . 
114. ld. at  ( ting i er . s i s J . t . . i t.,  . . ,  ( ) (i ternal t ti s itte )). 
115. orse, 127 S. t. at 2627-28 (citing ernonia c . ist. J . ct ,  . . ,  . 
. rs  . r ri ,  . t. ,  . 
. ld. 
16
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 3
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss2/3
WAITING TO EXHALE
reach of the Court's holding.' 18 Justice Alito emphasized that
educators may punish speech reasonably interpreted as advocating
illegal drug use so long as the speech cannot "plausibly be interpreted
as commenting on any political or social issue."' 1 9 Paradoxically, the
dissenting Justices did, in fact, suggest that Frederick's banner could
plausibly be interpreted as advocating the legalization of marijuana-
a pertinent political issue in Alaska.12 0 It appears that the thread
supporting Alito's limitations is the fact that Frederick claimed that
his banner was "meaningless and funny" rather than political in
nature. 121
Justice Thomas wrote separately to articulate his view that Tinker
should be overturned.12 2 Looking to the history of public education
and the courts, Thomas claimed that the First Amendment was not
originally understood to encompass student speech. 2 3 Therefore,
Morse could rightfully punish Frederick's banner simply because he
does not have a constitutionally protected right of free speech at
school.1
2 4
Justice Breyer, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part, would have foregone deciding the constitutional issue on the
merits. 2 5 Instead, he would have simply found that Frederick's claim
against Morse for monetary damages was barred by qualified
immunity. 126 Qualified immunity is a defense mandating a judgment
in favor of a government employee absent a clear violation of
another's rights. 2 7 Due to the complexity of student-speech
jurisprudence, evinced by the Court's own division on the issue,
Breyer contended that Morse did not clearly violate Frederick's rights
118. See Tim Hoffine, Experts Say Alito Key Factor in 'Bong Hits' Decision, STUDENT PRESS L.
CENTER, June 26, 2007, www.splc.org/newsflash.asp?id= 1559.
119. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2636 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 2650 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 2625.
122. Id. at 2630 (Thomas, J., concurring).
123. Id.
124. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2634 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 2638 (Breyer, J., concurring).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2640 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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when she confiscated his banner.' 28 Justice Breyer then suggested
that the Court could have disposed of Frederick's non-monetary
claims on non-speech-related grounds. 129 However, Chief Justice
Roberts in his majority opinion, found this approach beyond the
Court's reach because it was not raised by the parties nor considered
by the lower courts.
130
D. Justice Stevens 'Dissenting Opinion
Although Justice Stevens expressed concerns about the majority's
trivialization of First Amendment principles, he was most concerned
about the interpretation of the speech. 13 1 As for constitutional
principles, the dissent found that the majority invites "viewpoint
discrimination" and falls short of the Court's "imminent lawless
action" jurisprudence. 132 Indeed, Morse admitted punishing Frederick
because she disagreed with the message's viewpoint, which she
ascribed as promoting illegal drug use, and there was no showing that
the banner would have incited immediate unlawful conduct. 1
33
Conceding that these principles may need to be modified to suit the
school environment, the dissent expressed a willingness to tolerate
limited viewpoint discrimination for illegal drug advocacy and a
relaxing of the imminence requirements. 134 The dissent, however,
was not willing to accept the majority's characterization of "BONG
HiTS 4 JESUS" as reasonably advocating illegal drug use.' 35 The
dissent admonished that "to the extent the Court defers to the
principal's ostensibly reasonable judgment [in interpreting the
speech], it abdicates its constitutional responsibility" because speech
protections have never depended on the listener's interpretation.'
36
The dissent also insisted that the majority had no objective basis for
128. Id. at 2641 (Breyer, J., concurring).
129. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618,2643 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring).
130. Id. at2624.
131. Id. at 2643-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 2644-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 2645 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2646 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 2649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 2647 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 25:2
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 452 2008-2009
452 I   I ERSITY  I  l. :  
  i ated r.128 i  r  t  
t t l    rick's tary 
  c -related  r,  ti e 
 it  ,    
'   se     re  
  r courts. 130 
. i  s    
 ti      j rity's 
i i lization  ent ,  r ed 
  t tion   13l l 
i l s,   i t 
ti "   t  
 i r e ce. 132   i  rick 
se   's  
i  l   
  l  have incited immediate unlawful conduct. 133 
i g  i les      
 t,   
t ti     
i   e   
  '  t rization   
  l  ti   e.135  
  
'    t   
], ti l i ilit "  
i s r depended on the listener's interpretation.136 
  
[ .  
. t. ,  , 1., i . 
[ .  26  
[ . , . 
/ . ,  
[ . , ,  
. 26 ) ,  
. / . t  t , ., i ti ). 
/d.  , ., i ti . 
18
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 3
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss2/3
WAITING TO EXHALE
construing "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" as an advocacy for illegal drug
use.137 Because the message was ambiguous at best, the dissent
would have abided the Court's "abundant precedent.., that when the
'First Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the speaker."
' 138
III. CIRCUIT COURTS ANALYZE STUDENT THREATS IN THE WAKE OF
MORSE V. FREDERICK
It remains to be seen, on the whole, whether the Supreme Court's
re-Tinker-ing with its school-speech jurisprudence will provide much
needed clarification and guidance to lower courts, school officials,
and student speakers. With respect to student threats, circuit courts
are seemingly bereft of such clarification after Morse.'39 At the
writing of this Comment, the Eleventh, Second, and Fifth Circuits
have decided student threat cases by employing Morse somewhat
differently. 140 The Eleventh Circuit found that Morse's standard
governs speech reasonably interpreted as threatening violence. 14 1 The
Second Circuit found that Tinker applied; however, citing Morse, the
court evinced a departure from its speech-protectionist stance in favor
of a more diluted Tinker standard. 142 The Fifth Circuit applied Morse
to perceived threats of violence holding that schools may restrict
speech advocating a certain harmful activity, the prevention of which
is a compelling governmental interest. 
143
The likely impact of Morse on student threat cases in sister circuits
can be gleaned from Justice Alito's concurrence. 144 Justice Alito
wrote separately to cabin Morse's effect on free speech by qualifying
137. Id. at 2649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. Id. (citing Federal Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc.,127 S. Ct. 2652, 2674 (2007)).
139. See generally Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Central Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d
Cir. 2007); Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978 (1 1th Cir. 2007); Ponce v. Socorro Indep.
Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2007).
140. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Central Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007);
Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978 (11 th Cir. 2007); Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist.,
508 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2007).
141. Boim, 494 F.3d at 984.
142. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39.
143. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 769.
144. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618,2636-38 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).
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his joining the majority "on the understanding that the opinion does
not hold that the special characteristics of the public schools
necessarily justify any other speech restrictions."' 45 He was
concerned that a broad reading of Morse would allow schools to
punish any speech that interfered with the school's educational
mission.1 46 Therefore, he stressed that schools' disciplinary authority
must be tied to the special characteristics of the school
environment--citing the physical safety of students as specifically
relevant.147  Justice Alito acknowledged that, generally, the
government has limited authority to punish speech when it presents a
threat of violence. 148 When, however, students are compelled to
attend school with others capable of inflicting harm, "school officials
must have greater authority to intervene before speech leads to
violence."'1
49
Justice Alito opined that Tinker would sufficiently thwart violence
in most cases, but he left open the possibility that Morse would apply
in limited circumstances where student safety is implicated. 150 In
light of the highly publicized shootings in recent years, lower courts
are less willing to wait for signs forecasting a "material and
substantial" disruption before permitting school action under
Tinker.15 1 Instead, courts may likely read Morse to sanction
disciplinary action at an earlier stage than Tinker citing the need to
allow schools to "step in before actual violence erupts."'15 2 Alito's
"limiting" opinion hinted that school violence may be an area where
Morse could extend; therefore, lower courts may opt for Morse's
more deferential standard rather than require schools to show
evidence of a disruption under Tinker.153 In what follows, this
145. Id. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring).
146. Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring).
148. Id. (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam)).
149. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2638 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 984 (2007) (citing the need to act
quickly as made apparent in highly publicized school shootings and applying Morse rather than Tinker).
152. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring); see Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508
F.3d 765, 769 (5th Cir. 2007).
153. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Aito, J., concurring); Ponce, 508 F.3d 765.
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Comment examines three Circuit Court cases that have tested the
unchartered waters of student speech under Morse. 1
54
A. The Second Circuit Backs Away From Its Protectionist Stance in
Wisniewski v. Board of Education of the Weedsport Central School
District.
On July 5, 2007, ten days after the Supreme Court announced its
decision in Morse, the Second Circuit cited, but did not rely upon,
Morse in upholding a school's suspension of eighth-grader Aaron
Wisniewski ("Aaron") for an instant message (IM) icon he created at
home on his parents' computer. 155 The icon depicted a crude drawing
of a gun aimed at a person's head, a bullet firing, and dots suggesting
splattered blood.156 The image also included the message "Kill Mr.
VanderMolen"--Aaron's English teacher at the time.'57
Aaron used this icon as his IM identifier for three weeks to
communicate from his parents' computer with about fifteen friends,
including some classmates. 158 The IM icon came onto school
property only because another classmate happened to see the icon and
reported it to Mr. VanderMolen, later supplying him with a copy. 5
9
Mr. VanderMolen reported the drawing to the school principals who
then forwarded it to the local police, school superintendent, and
Aaron's parents. 1
60
Aaron expressed remorse for creating the image, and claimed it
was intended as a joke-he had created the icon shortly after his class
was informed of the school's zero tolerance policy regarding
threats. 16 1 The principal suspended Aaron for five days pending a
154. See supra text accompanying notes 155-241.
155. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Central Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
156. Id at 36.
157. Id.
158. Id. AOL IM software permits a message sender to create a screen icon to appear alongside the
sender's name, thus serving as an identifier during communications with the sender. Id. at 35.
159. Id. at 36. A feature of the M software allows any party receiving a message from one with a
picture icon to copy that icon and transmit it to any other party conversing during an IM exchange. Id. at
35.
160. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2007).
161. Id.
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hearing regarding further action. 162 Despite both a police investigator
and psychiatrist concluding that Aaron intended the icon as a joke
and posed no actual threat, the district's Board of Education
suspended Aaron one semester for threatening a teacher in violation
of school policy.163 Aaron's parents filed suit on his behalf, claiming
a violation of his First Amendment rights and seeking damages under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.164 The District Court upheld the school's actions,
finding Aaron's speech constituted a "true threat" under Watts,
therefore falling outside First Amendment protecttions.
165
The day after the Virginia Tech shootings, the Second Circuit
heard oral arguments for Aaron's case on appeal. 166 The Court
declined to address whether the icon posed a true threat, finding
Tinker gives "school officials ... significantly broader authority to
sanction student speech than the Watts standard allows."' 67 Although
mirroring the phrasing of Morse's holding, 168 the Court applied the
Tinker "substantial disruption" standard to what it deemed "a
student's expression reasonably understood as urging violent
conduct."' 1
69
Judge Newman writing for the Second Circuit held that it was
reasonably foreseeable that Aaron's off-campus conduct would be
discovered by school officials and would "'materially and
substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.",' 170 To
reach its holding, the Court had to reconcile Thomas v. Board of
Education, Granville Central School District where it previously held
162. Id.
163. Id. at 36-37.
164. Id. at 37. Aaron's family ultimately moved away from Weedsport due to the continuing hostility
surrounding the facts of this case. Id.
165. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 5:02CV1403, 2006 WL
1741023, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. June 20, 2006).
166. Allison Torres Burtka, Student's IM Threat is Not Protected Speech, Second Circuit Says, 43
TRIAL 68, 69 (2007).
167. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007).
168. Morse v. Frederick held that schools may restrict "student expression that they reasonably regard
as promoting illegal drug use." 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007).
169. Wisniewski, 494 F,3d at 38.
170. Id. at 38-39 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)).
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that "the arm of [school] authority does not reach beyond the
schoolhouse gate."'
7 1
In Thomas, school officials suspended four students for publishing an
underground satirical paper emulating National Lampoon after officials
confiscated a copy within the school. 172 The students had used school
typewriters to transcribe articles, received occasional teacher feedback on
grammar and content, and stored the copies of the publication in a
teacher's closet. 173 However, the Thomas Court found that "any activity
within the school itself was de minimis" because the publication "was
conceived, executed, and distributed outside the school., 174 The same
Judge Newman writing in Wisniewski 175 found in Thomas that
"school discipline was improperly imposed upon the students for their
essentially off-campus activity.' 76
The Wisniewski Court attempted to square these two cases by citing
dicta from a footnote in Thomas as indicating its "recogni[tion] that off-
campus conduct can create a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption
within a school.' 177 The Court found that the IM icon could foreseeably
incite substantial disruption within the school from off-campus because of
its "threatening content" and "extensive distribution... [to] 15 recipients,
including some of Aaron's classmates, during a three-week circulation
period."' 178 However, the allegedly offensive publication in Thomas,
which included articles on masturbation and prostitution and was sold to
nearly one hundred students over the course of a week could just as
foreseeably incite disruption within the school. 179 Thus, this case
illustrates a shift in the Second Circuit's thinking that may likely have
171. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1044-45 (2d Cir. 1979);
Hilden, supra note 110.
172. Id. at 1045.
173. Id. at 1045, 1050.
174. Id. at 1050.
175. Judge Newman is cited by the Supreme Court in Fraser for his articulation in Thomas that "the
First Amendment gives a high school student the classroom right to wear Tinker's armband, but not
Cohen's jacket." Id. at 1057 (Newman J., concurring).
176. Id. at 1053 (Newman J., concurring) (emphasis added).
177. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007)
(citing Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1052 n.17).
178. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39-40.
179. See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1045.
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resulted from Morse's recent grant of additional authority to school
officials.
1 80
Additional evidence of Morse's impact may be deduced from the
Court's interpretation of the icon as "reasonably . . . urging violent
conduct."' 8 1 In doing so the Second Circuit affirmed that a school
official's interpretation of the icon as a threat of violence warranted pre-
clusive effect. 18 2 While certainly a possible interpretation, Wisniewski
claimed and the police and psychologist agreed, that the icon was just a
poor attempt at a joke.183 Thus, just as in Morse where the Supreme Court
dismissed the student's interpretation as possible and deferred to the
school's reasonable interpretation, the Second Circuit based its constitu-
tional analysis on an educator's reasonable interpretation of the
message.
184
The national mood surrounding the day-before Virginia Tech shootings
likely influenced the Court's finding that the educator's interpretation of
the off-campus icon was reasonable. 185 However, the Court's deferential
posture stands in sharp contrast to its insistence in Thomas that off-
campus conduct must be evaluated by an impartial, independent decision-
maker because:
[When] a school official acts as both prosecutor and judge... [h]is
intimate association with the school itself and his understandable
desire to preserve institutional decorum give him a vested interest in
suppressing controversy. Accordingly, "under the guise of beneficent
concern for the welfare of school children, school authorities, albeit
unwittingly, might permit prejudices of the community to prevail.' 186
180. See Hilden, supra note 110.
181. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38.
182. Id. at 37.
183. Id. at 36.
184. Id. at38.
185. See Allison Torres Burtka, Student's IM Threat is Not Protected Speech, Second Circuit Says, 43
TRIAL 68, 69 (2007).
186. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1051 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting
James v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 575 (2d Cir. 1972)).
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The Thomas Court also explained that strict judicial impartiality is
necessary to preserve breathing space for student speakers because the
brevity of most school sanctions thwarts effective review and the high
cost of litigation conscribes most students, even those whose rights are
clearly violated, "to suffer in silence."'
187
The Wisniewski Court's departure from its protectionist stance suggests
that, although decided under Tinker, the effect of Morse is more than first
meets the eye. 188 But for Morse's expansion of school authority, the
Wisniewski Court may have been more willing to adhere to its principled
stand for student-speech protections expressed in Thomas.1 8 9 While
Morse's impact on the Second Circuit holding is implied, the Eleventh
Circuit directly applied Morse to uphold disciplinary action against
student speech reasonably perceived as threatening school violence.
190
B. The Eleventh Circuit Upholds Disciplinary Action of Student
Speech Reasonably Construed As A Threat of Violence in Boim v.
Fulton County School District.
On July 31, 2007, in Boim, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the
Supreme Court's rationale, as articulated in Morse, to create a per se
exception for speech reasonably perceived to threaten school
violence. 191 Comparing the governmental interest in preventing
student drug abuse in Morse with that of preventing school violence,
the Eleventh Circuit found that the "[Morse] rationale applies
equally, if not more strongly" when considered in light of "the special
characteristics of the school environment."'
' 92
This case arose in October 2003 at Roswell High School in Fulton
County, Georgia, when then-freshman Rachel Boim ("Rachel") was
suspended ten days and later expelled for a fictional story she wrote
at home in her personal journal about "a girl who falls asleep in class,
dreams she kills her math teacher, then wakes up and nothing
187. Id. at 1052.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 168-187; infra text accompanying notes 189-90.
189. See Hilden, supra note 110.
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happens."' 193 The story was discovered by an art teacher who
confiscated the journal when Rachel's friend was caught writing in it
during class. 194 The day after finding the story, the art teacher
notified school officials, who in turn notified the school's police
officer, all of whom were concerned by the story's violent nature and
that both the story narrator and Rachel had math for sixth period.
195
The story, in its entirety, reads as follows:
As I walk to school from my sisters [sic] car my stomach ties
itself in nots. [sic] I have nervousness tingeling [sic] up and
down my spine and my heart races. No one knows what is going
to happen. I have the gun hidden in my pocket. I cross the lawn
and hed [sic] to my locker on A hall. Smiling sweetly to my
friends hoping they dont [sic] notice the cold sweat that has
developed on my forhead [sic]. Im [sic] walking up to the front
office when the bell rings for class to start. So afraid that I think I
might pass out. I ask if my mother dropped off a book I need.
No. My first to [sic] classes pass by my heart thumping so hard
Im [sic] afraid every one can hear it. Constantly I can feel the
gun in my pocket. 3rd peroid [sic], 4th, 5th then 6th peroid [sic]
my time is comming [sic]. I enter the class room my face pale.
My stomach has tied itself in so many knots its [sic] doubtful_I
will ever be able to untie them. Then he starts taking role [sic].
Yes, my math teacher. I lothe [sic] him with every bone in my
body. Why? I dont [sic] know. This is it. I stand up and pull the
gun from my pocket. BANG the force blows him back and every
one in the class sits there in shock. BANG he falls to the floor
and some one [sic] lets out an ear piercing scream. Shaking I put
the gun in my pocket and run from the room. By now the school
193. Rachel Boim describes the content of her story for an online interview. Girl Expelledfor Writing
Story About Killing Teacher, CNN.CoM, October 25, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/EDUCATION/
10/24/boim.diary/index.html. Rachel, who lived outside of Denver during the Columbine shootings,
thought her exposure to violence may have influenced her story ideas, and she insisted "it was strictly a
work of fiction." Id.; see also Interview by Soledad O'Brien with Rachel and David Boim, for CNN
(Oct. 25, 2003), transcript available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/EDUCATION/10/24/cnna.boim.
194. Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 980 (1 th Cir. 2007).
195. Id. at 981.
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police officer is running after me. Easy I can out run him. Out
the doors, almost to the car. I can get away. BANG this time a
shot was fired at me. I turn just in time to see the bullet rushing
at me, almost like its [sic] in slow motion. Then, the bell rings, I
pick my head off my desk, shake my head and gather up my
books off to my next class. 96
In suspending Rachel, school officials determined that Rachel's story
violated three school rules. 197 The County Board of Education
reversed the expulsion but upheld the suspension. 198 Rachel, through
her parents, brought suit against the school district, superintendent,
and principal seeking nominal damages and an injunction to expunge
the suspension from Rachel's record. 199 The District Court awarded
summary judgment to the school officials, finding sufficient facts to
meet Tinker's standard.2 °0 Specifically, the District Court found
"'facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast
substantial disruption of or material interference with school
activities' because the school could have reasonably feared Rachel
would commit an act of violence or that school activities would be
disrupted if read by other students.
20 1
Eleven days prior to oral arguments before the Eleventh Circuit on
April 27, 2007, the Virginia Tech massacre horrified the nation,
sparking ubiquitous media coverage.20 2 Then, on June 25, 2007, the
Supreme Court handed down Morse v. Frederick.2 °3 In Boim's July
31, 2007 decision, the Eleventh Circuit held there "is no First
196. Id. at 980-81.
197. The school determined that Rachel violated the following rules: Rule JD 4(iii) (threatening
bodily harm); Rule JD 10 (failure to obey school commands), and Rule JD 17 (displaying disrespectful
conduct). Rule ID 4(iii), which is of greatest relevance, states in relevant part: "a student shall not
attempt to cause physical injury, threaten bodily harm, or behave in such a way as could reasonably
cause physical injury to a school employee." Id. at 981.
198. Id. at 982.
199. Id.
200. Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., No. Civ.A.l:05CV2836MHS, 2006 WL 2189733 at *3 (N.D.
Ga. Aug. 1, 2006) (slip copy).
201. Id. at *3-4 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)).
202. E.g., Alyson M. Palmer, School Case Will Test Threats, Free Speech: Judges to Hear of Student
Suspendedfor Story About Shooting a Teacher, 4 DAILY REPORT 24 (April 24, 2007).
203. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2618 (2007).
20081
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Amendment right allowing a student to knowingly make comments..
. that reasonably could be perceived as a threat of school violence...
while on school property during the school day., 204 Without much
discussion, the Court found Rachel's story "without doubt" was
reasonably construed as a threat of violence. 20 5 The Court also found
it inconsequential that Rachel did not intend for others to see the
story, because by taking it to school she "increased the likelihood to
the point of certainty that [it] would be seen." 20 6
The Eleventh Circuit relied on Morse's holding that schools may
restrict speech reasonably interpreted as advocating illegal drug use
to also allow the restriction of speech reasonably interpreted as a
threat of school violence.2 °7 In doing so, the Boim Court
characterized Morse's holding as "broad" and its rationale as directly
208analogous. Specifically, a compelling governmental interest in
preventing school violence is comparable to the interest in preventing
student drug abuse, and "special characteristics" of the school
environment render students equally vulnerable to both drugs and
violence. 209 In reaching its holding, the Court also mirrored Morse by
citing a Congressional mandate tying funds to school safety as
evidence of a compelling interest.
2 10
Judge Black, concurring in the result, opined that the Court should
have limited its holding by applying the Tinker standard to find that
the school reasonably anticipated a material disruption in discovering
211Rachel's story. In something of a Freudian slip, the Fifth Circuit
agreed with Justice Black that Tinker properly governed Rachel's
poem, not Morse, because the violence depicted therein was "discrete
in scope and directed at adults" rather than a mass school shooting.212
204. Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 984 (1 th Cir. 2007).
205. Id. at 985.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 984.
208. Id.
209. Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 984 (11 th Cir. 2007).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 985.
212. In Ponce, the Fifth Circuit characterized Boim as upholding the school's suspension under
Tinker, when in fact it did so under Morse. Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 771 n.2
(5th Cir. 2007).
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In the following section, this Comment further addresses this
discrepancy.2
13
C. The Fifth Circuit Upholds Punishment of Student Speech
Perceived to Threaten "Columbine-esque " Violence in Ponce v.
Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist.
Strangely, the Fifth Circuit recently mischaracterized Boim as
being properly analyzed under Tinker to uphold a student's
suspension. 2 14 But, as previously mentioned, it was analyzed under
Morse.215 This gaffe is particularly curious given the similarities
between the poem in Boim and that of Ponce, its recent student-
speech decision upholding the school's disciplinary action under
Morse.2 16 In misreading Boim, it forewent the opportunity to apply
the Second Circuit's case as persuasive authority, and instead
distinguished its facts on rather tenuous grounds.2 17 This confusion
perhaps underscores the lack of clarification Morse provides to
reviewing courts.
On November 20, 2007, as I put the finishing touches on this
Comment, the Fifth Circuit decided Ponce, which applied a Morse
analysis to hold that "speech pos[ing] a direct threat to the physical
safety of the school population" is not protected by the First
Amendment. 218 The case arose in August 2005 when then-sophomore
E.P. was suspended for three days and relegated to an alternative
education program for a fictional story he wrote in a notebook
diary. 219 In this story told in the first-person, the "author" orders a
pseudo-Nazi group to exact brutal violence against "two homosexuals
and seven colored people," and another student's dog.
220
Additionally, the story described the pseudo-Nazi group's plan to
213. See infra text accompanying notes 214-240.
214. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 771 n.2.
215. Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 984 (11 th Cir. 2007).
216. Compare Boim, 494 F.3d at 980-81, with Ponce, 508 F.3d at 766.
217. See infra text accompanying notes 234-241.
218. Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 766 (5th Cir. 2007).
219. Id. at 766-67.
220. Id. at 766.
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carry out a Columbine-like attack on Montwood High School-
which was also the name of E.P.'s school.22'
The story was brought to the attention of Assistant Principal
Aguirre ("Aguirre") through the following chain of events: E.P. told
another student about the notebook; the informing student told a
teacher; and after delaying a day the teacher told Aguirre. 22 2 When
questioned about the threats, E.P. steadfastly maintained that he was
merely creating a work of fiction.223 E.P.'s mother, also a creative
writer, avowed the notebook was fiction.224 Aguirre allowed E.P. to
resume his classes and announced he would make an administrative
decision the following day.225 After several reads, Aguirre decided
that a few of the lines amounted to a "terroristic threat" against the
school in violation of the Student Code of Conduct.226 Aguirre
subsequently suspended E.P. for three days, recommended his
transfer to the alternative school (which was later upheld by the
school board), and had E.P. arrested.227 The county attorney's office,
however, declined to prosecute.
228
E.P.'s parents, concerned about their son's ability to gain college
acceptance, filed a 42 U.S.C. §1983 action and moved to enjoin the
school district from, among other things, placing him in an alternative
school and referencing the incident on his permanent record. 229 The
District Court granted E.P.'s injunction under Tinker, finding
insufficient evidence of disruption.
230
The Fifth Circuit, on appeal, reversed the preliminary injunction
finding E.P. had no substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits
because Morse foreclosed his First Amendment protection.23 1 The
Ponce Court read Morse's controlling and Justice Alito's concurring
221. Id.
222. Id.




227. Id. at 767.
228. Id. at n.l.
229. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 767.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 768.
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opinions concomitantly to provide that "[t]o the extent that
preventing a harmful activity may be classified as an 'important-
indeed, perhaps compelling interest,' speech advocating that activity
may be prohibited by school administrators with little further
inquiry." 2
32
Whether the harm ascribed to a student's speech is sufficiently
compelling to trigger a Morse analysis depends on the extent to
which it advocates a "demonstrably grave harm and that derives that
gravity from the 'special danger' to the physical safety of students
arising from the school environment."
233
The Fifth Circuit found that E.P.'s speech warranted content-based
restriction because it advocated a grave harm and that it derived its
gravity from the special dangers attributable to schools-namely a
"captive group of persons protected only by the limited personnel of
the school. 234 The Court distinguished threats of mass shootings,
invoking Morse analysis, from threats aimed at individual teachers
that are properly analyzed under Tinker.235 Specifically, in a footnote,
the Court averred that Boim's fictional story about a girl dreaming of
shooting her teacher was properly decided under Tinker.236 Thus,
while the Fifth Circuit wrested this distinction from Boim in an effort
to justify extending Morse to student threats, it did so in vain.237
Indeed, Boim had already extended Morse to speech reasonably
construed as a threat of school violence-including a sole threat
against a teacher.238 Thus, within four months of Morse, two circuits
had somewhat inconsistently extended its holding to restrict student
threats of violence.239 The Fifth Circuit sets a high threshold,
triggered only by Columbine-esque threats; 240 but the Eleventh
232. Id. at 769 (quoting Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628 (quoting Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 661 (1995))).
233. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 770.
234. Id. at 771.
235. Id. at 771 n.2.
236. Id.
237. See Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 984 (11 th Cir. 2007).
238. Id.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 234-38; infra text accompanying notes 240-41.
240. See Ponce, 508 F.3d at 771.
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Circuit's lower threshold sweeps up all threats involving school
violence.
241
IV. ANALYSIS: GOING FORWARD
Given that the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have applied Morse to
school threat contexts, and the Second Circuit's discussion of Morse in
the same, what follows is an examination of how the principles from
these circuit-court opinions and the Supreme Court's student-speech
jurisprudence can be read together to suggest a two-step analysis of
student free speech claims in the context of apparent threats of
violence. 242 Consistent not only with Morse's own terms, and the
previous precedents of Tinker, Hazelwood, and Fraser, this approach
holds the additional benefit of resonating with social science insights
into the nature of violence in schools and the effect of school speech
policies thereon.243 To unfold these two steps, let us return, briefly, to
Morse and its holding.
Morse held that schools may take disciplinary action to protect its
students from speech reasonably regarded as advocating illegal drug
use.244 Specifically, in Morse, the principal did not violate the First
Amendment when she confiscated the banner and suspended
Frederick who was responsible for the banner.245 In light of the
limiting language included in concurring opinions of this 5-4
decision, Morse implicitly provides a school with a scalpel, not an ax,
to restrict speech in furtherance of student safety while refraining
from unfairly punishing those who do not pose a safety threat.246 This
241. See Boim, 494 F.3d at 984 (expanding Morse to conclude "there also is no First Amendment
right allowing a student to knowingly make comments, whether oral or written that reasonably could be
perceived as a threat of school violence, whether general or specific, while on school property during the
school day").
242. See supra Parts H-Ill.
243. See infra text accompanying notes 262, 286-89.
244. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618,2622 (2007).
245. Id.
246. The concurring opinions indicate that Morse should be applied only insofar as absolutely
necessary because it authorizes a viewpoint-based restriction on speech-the most abhorred abridgment
of speech. Cf Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2637-38 (Alito, J., concurring) (Justice Alito discussed, on the one
hand, the need to give schools adequate authority "to intervene before speech leads to violence," but he
also insisted that Morse provided only a limited expansion of school authority "standing at the far
[Vol. 25:2
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subtlety of Morse's holding heralds not-so-subtle effects in the school
threat context by allowing schools a safe harbor to take immediate
action in the face of an unknown risk.247 But this safe harbor is lifted
once the school has an opportunity to assess the risk and any
subsequent restriction on speech would need separate justification
under Morse's rationale.
248
Morse's rationale implies that each school disciplinary action must
be adjudged separately.249 The Fifth Circuit correctly adduced that
Morse's controlling and Justice Alito's concurring opinions read in
tandem allow content-based restriction of violent speech only insofar
as the disciplinary act prevents a sufficiently compelling harmful
activity. 2 5  In other words, the only justification for abandoning a
Tinker analysis would be to prevent the type of grave harm that is
typically unheralded by disruption-that which does not "permit[]
school officials to step in before actual violence erupts.",25  Morse
applies only to this "compelling interest" authorizing school officials
to take any reasonable necessary steps to quell threats reasonably
perceived.252 But beyond the realm of this compelling interest, the
broad deference accorded school officials becomes more constricted,
such that Tinker and its progeny apply.253 That is, as a school's
actions move from ensuring safety to punishing a student accused of
disruption, the school must justify the latter actions under the less
deferential standards of Tinker, Hazelwood, and Fraser.
254
reaches of what the First Amendment permits" and that Tinker's speech-protective standard should
apply in most cases); Id. at 2638-39 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (finding the Court should not reach the constitutional question due to the concerns regarding
viewpoint restrictions and instead should bar the claim under qualified immunity grounds).
247. See infra text accompanying notes 257-64.
248. See infra text accompanying notes 265-300.
249. In Morse, the Court discussed each school action separately in its elaboration of the holding, and
provided contextual justification for each. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622, 2629. First, the
principal permissibly confiscated Frederick's banner in the immediacy because she "had to decide to
act-or not to act-on the spot." Id at 2629. Then the Court found that the principal permissibly
suspended Frederick because she later reasonably concluded that it violated established school policy by
promoting illegal drug use. Id.
250. Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 772 (5th Cir. 2007).
251. Id. at 770 (quoting Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring)).
252. Id at 769-70.
253. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2637-38.
254. See infra text accompanying notes 273-300.
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A. A "Safe Harbor" to Ensure School Safety and Assess the Threat
Consistent with Morse, school officials may act upon speech
reasonably construed as a threat of school violence. 255 Moreover, the
reasonableness of this interpretation is necessarily adjudged in
context of the exigencies of school threats where "the difficulty of
identifying warning signs . . . is intrinsic to the harm itself.,256 In
Morse, the principal's "on the spot" action against Frederick was
deemed necessary in the face of his sudden and unexpected
conduct.257 That is, the principal permissibly confiscated Frederick's
banner because she "had to decide to act--or not to act--on the spot"
against a message that upon first impression appears to advocate drug
use. 2 58 As such, it is reasonable for educators to interpret speech as
advocating violence when such speech facially portrays a threat, and
the school must act "on the spot. 25
9
In Ponce, the Fifth Circuit affirmed that "[s]chool administrators
must be permitted to react quickly and decisively to address a threat
of physical violence against their students, without worrying that they
will have to face years of litigation second-guessing their judgment as
to whether the threat posed a real risk of substantial disturbance. 26 °
Similarly, in Boim, the Eleventh Circuit recognized an "undisputably
compelling interest in acting quickly to prevent violence on school
property, especially during regular school hours."26'
Consistent with this jurisprudence, recent social science research
indicates that important clues preceding a violent act may be revealed
in, inter alia, poems, drawings, and diary entries.262 Therefore,
schools need some authority to take immediate action, often before
careful reflection, without fear of litigation.263 Having had the benefit
255. Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978,984 (2007).
256. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 771.
257. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618,2629 (2007).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 772.
261. Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 984 (11th Cir. 2007).
262. MARY ELLEN O'TOOLE, THE SCHOOL SHOOTER: A THREAT ASSESSMENT PERSPECTIVE 16
(2000), available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/school/school2.pdf.
263. See Ponce, 508 F.3d at 772.
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of hindsight and time for a thorough assessment, however, schools do
not reasonably interpret speech as advocating violence where a
student does not pose a real threat to other students.
264
B. Exiting the "Safe Harbor" in Moving from Protection to
Punishment
A Morse analysis is triggered only by the presence of a sufficiently
compelling interest outweighing the student's constitutional
265protection. When schools act pursuant to a sufficiently compelling
interest, Morse affords schools a tremendous amount of deference.
266
For example, in Morse, the sufficiently compelling interest was
deterring drug use by students. 267 When the principal punished an
ambiguous banner she interpreted as advocating drug use-acting in
furtherance of the compelling interest-the Court gave great
deference to her interpretation of the message.
268
The Eleventh and Fifth Circuits have expanded Morse to threats of
school violence, finding a sufficiently compelling interest in
protecting the physical safety of students. In the furtherance of such
an interest, under Morse, schools are given broad authority to act
swiftly to restore order and safety.269 Consistent with this, Boim
applied Morse only to the ten-day suspension of a student who wrote
a poem describing a girl's dream of shooting her teacher.270 The
student's expulsion was not an issue before the court because the
County Board of Education had overturned it.271 However, the Boim
Court would not likely have upheld the expulsion under Morse
because it clearly articulated the compelling interest as "acting
quickly to prevent violence."
272
264. See ROBERT A. FErN ET AL., THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS: A GUIDE TO MANAGING
THREATENING SITUATIONS AND TO CREATING SAFE SCHOOL CLIMATES 63-66 (2002).
265. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 769 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2638 (Alito, J., concurring)).
266. Id. at 772.
267. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2628 (2007).
268. Id. at 2625 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
269. See Ponce, 508 F.3d at 772; Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d at 984 (11 th Cir. 2007).
270. Boim, 494 F.3d at 981, 984.
271. Id. at 982.
272. See ld. at 984.
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However, once school officials step beyond furthering a
sufficiently compelling interest in protecting students and into
punishing the speaker, the Morse trigger no longer exists.273 Restated,
schools have "broader authority" when they act "'not to punish...
but to avert perceived potential harm."' 274 The broad discretion
afforded schools in acting to protect student safety is narrowed once
student safety is ensured and a school has time to evaluate the true
nature of the perceived threat. 275 Indeed, Justice Alito labored to
make clear that Morse applies to a very narrow category of speech-
only that which both threatens a grave harm to students and that
could not be adequately addressed by Tinker, which "in most cases..
. permits school officials to step in before actual violence erupts."
276
Further, it is important to note that, although both Boim and Ponce
found that protecting students was a sufficiently compelling interest,
neither court held that punishing students was.277
Once in the realm of punishing, which is beyond a sufficiently
compelling interest, the school must justify its actions under Tinker
by showing "facts which might reasonably have led school
authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material
interference with school activities." 278 Therefore, once the school
initiates emergency action and has time to adequately assess the
threat, any additional action must arise from a determination that: (1)
the speech may still reasonably be regarded as posing a threat of
physical harm, and thus, disciplinary action is in furtherance of a
compelling interest per Morse; or (2) such facts exist allowing the
school to reasonably forecast substantial disruption within the school
under Tinker.2 79 Justice Alito correctly opined that most threats are
adequately addressed under the Tinker standard.28 °
273. See generally Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
274. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist.,
257 F.3d 981,983 (9th Cir. 2001)).
275. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring); see also Ponce, 508 F.3d at 770.
276. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring).
277. See Ponce, 508 F.3d at 769; Boirn v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d at 984 (1 1th Cir. 2007).
278. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
279. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2637-38 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).
280. See id. Further, although it would not have changed the outcome, Judge Black's concurrence in
Boim urged that the Court should have applied Tinker to find that the school reasonably anticipated a
[VoL 25:2
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This second-step is consistent with Morse because the principal's
later decision to suspend Frederick for displaying "BONG HiTS 4
JESUS" was also in furtherance of the compelling interest-not
merely to punish.281 In Morse, the "important-indeed, perhaps
compelling" interest was deterring drug use among schoolchildren.282
The Morse Court further explained that the gravity of this harm is
derived in large part from the appearance of tolerance or leniency on
the school's part.283 Therefore, even though the suspension may have
had a punitive effect, the Court found that it was necessary for the
school to separate itself from the message and that "failing to act
would send a powerful message to the students" that the school was
not serious about the dangers of illegal drug use.
284
In the school threat context, however, action that is strictly punitive
does not further the compelling interest of protecting students from
school violence. 285 Rather, research indicates that such punishment is
indeed likely to undermine the prevention of school violence.
286
Although school administrators may feel the need to exact punitive
action against a threatening student to "set an example," in fact
"suspension or expulsion of a student can create the risk of triggering
either an immediate or a delayed violent response., 287 Moreover,
research indicates that schools must carefully assess the potential
threat to determine its credibility and likelihood of occurrence before
fashioning an additional response.288 Otherwise, treating all threats
the same could be "dangerous, leading to potential underestimation of
serious threats, overreaction to less serious ones, and unfairly
punishing or stigmatizing students who are in fact not dangerous."
289
material disruption in discovering her fictional story about a girl dreaming of shooting her teacher. The
description of the teacher in the student's story matched that of her actual teacher and thus could be said
to reasonably forecast disruption in the classroom. Boia, 494 F.3d at 985 (Black, J., concurring).
281. See generally Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618.
282. Id. at 2628.
283. Id. (quoting Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,661 (1995)).
284. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629.
285. See FEIN ET AL., supra note 264, at 64. ("The response with the greatest punitive power may or
may not have the greatest preventive power.").
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. See O'TOOLE, supra note 262, at 5.
289. Id.
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A Ninth Circuit case provides an illustration of how a court should
conduct an analysis under this second step in the school threat
context. 29 In LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., eleventh-grader James
asked his teacher her opinion of a poem he wrote, in which the
narrator describes shooting twenty-eight students and committing
suicide.29 1 The teacher, concerned that the poem was a cry for help,
consulted with the school psychologist and school officials.292
Ultimately, the school "emergency expelled" James based on their
assessment that he, inter alia, had expressed suicidal tendencies,
experienced domestic troubles, and broken up with a girlfriend-all
in addition to writing the poem. 293 The school also maintained
documentation of the expulsion in James' permanent file.2 94 Later the
school rescinded its expulsion and allowed James to resume classes
once he was evaluated by a psychiatrist, at the school district's
expense, and deemed to not pose a threat to himself or others.
295
James and his father initiated an action claiming a violation of his
First Amendment rights and sought, inter alia, to permanently enjoin
the school from maintaining documentation of the expulsion in his
file.29 6 The District Court granted partial summary judgment in favor
of James and enjoined the school from placing negative
documentation in James' file.2 97 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
reversed partial summary judgment with respect to the emergency
expulsion, finding sufficient facts that the school could have
reasonably anticipated substantial disruption under Tinker.
298
However, the court affirmed the injunction requiring the school to
remove the negative documentation because the letter was filed "after
the perceived threat had subsided ...and thus went beyond the
school's legitimate documentation needs." 299 The Ninth Circuit
290. See Lavine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001).
291. Id. at 983-84.
292. Id. at 984.
293. Id. at 984-85.
294. Id. at 986.
295. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 2001).
296. Id. at 986.
297. Id. at 986-87.
298. Id. at 989-90.
299. Id. at 992.
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explained that the school had no legitimate interest in permanently
staining James' record and impeding his ability to secure future
education or employment. 30 0
CONCLUSION
After more than twenty years of silence, the Supreme Court in
Morse has reinvigorated the debate regarding the outer limits of
schools' disciplinary authority with respect to student speech.30 1 As
such, lower courts currently have four Supreme Court decisions
forming the jurisprudential backdrop for their rulings."' As Tinker
first announced, the First Amendment does apply to schools such that
students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 30 3 Under Fraser, however,
schools may take action against "vulgar and lewd speech" because
such speech undermines the school's need to teach the fundamental
values of civility. 304 Hazelwood next distinguished speech merely
occurring at school from speech bearing the imprimatur of the school,
allowing schools to censor such "school-sponsored" speech to ensure
that the "views of the individual speaker are not erroneously
attributed to the school."30 5 In July 2007, Morse announced that
schools may punish speech reasonably interpreted as promoting
illegal drug use where doing so serves an "important-indeed
perhaps compelling" interest in preventing student drug use.306
It is important to emphasize that Tinker is still good law. 30 7 In each
subsequent student-speech case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
Tinker principle that students do not "shed their constitutional rights
300. Id.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 141-300.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 46-140.
303. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
304. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
305. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
306. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2628 (2007) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 661 (1995)).
307. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622 (reaffirming the Tinker principle that students retain their
constitutional rights at school).
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to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."'30 8 Given
the extent to which the Court has chipped away at Tinker over the
past twenty years, it is important to remember what it held-students
retain their First Amendment rights at schools. 309 As such, the default
is that a student's speech is protected. Indeed, Tinker left open the
possibility that punishment might have been permissible had there
been evidence of substantial disruption-focusing on the result of
speech rather than its content. 31 It did not, however, hold "that
suppression of speech in some circumstances is permitted, but rather
that in the circumstance before the Court it was not constitutionally
permitted.",311 Therefore, it is from this protectionist posture that
lower courts should apply Tinker.
312
Additionally, it is important to note that if the Supreme Court had
wanted to use Morse as an opportunity to give schools complete
discretion in disciplinary matters, it could have done so. But it did
not.313 Instead, Morse, as further elucidated by Justice Alito's
concurrence, "goes no further than to hold that a public school may
restrict speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as
advocating illegal drug use."314 Further, Justice Alito hints that the
outermost reach of Morse applies only to a narrow category of speech
which both: (1) threatens a grave harm to students' physical safety
and derives that harm from the special circumstances of the school
environment, and; (2) could not be adequately addressed by Tinker
which "in most cases . . .permits school officials to step in before
actual violence erupts."
315
In just a few short months since its decision, the Circuit Courts
have grappled with Morse's implication in the context of student
threats.316 The Eleventh and Fifth Circuits have applied Morse, albeit
308. Id.; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680 (internal quotations omitted).
309. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
310. Idat509.
311. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 279 F.3d 719, 726 (2002) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) (emphasis in original).
312. See id
313. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).
314. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring).
315. Id. at 2638; see Ponce, 508 F.3d at 770.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 155-241.
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slightly differently, to allow punishment of perceived threats of
school violence. 317 The Second Circuit, while not directly applying
Morse, constricted its once protectionist interpretation of Tinker to
encompass student threats. 31 8 Unless and until the Supreme Court
grants certiorari to clarify the constitutionality of schools' action
against perceived threats, lower courts must search for a balance
between augmenting schools' disciplinary authority and guarding
students' free speech rights.
3 19
In a related context, Justice O'Connor dissented in the Court's
decision upholding suspicionless drug testing of all student athletes in
light of a compelling interest to prevent student drug abuse. 320
Recognizing the need to strike a balance between keeping schools
safe and protecting students' constitutional rights, she articulated the
following:
It cannot be too often stated that the greatest threats to our
constitutional freedoms come in times of crises. But we must
also stay mindful that not all government responses to such times
are hysterical overreactions; some crises are quite real, and when
they are, they serve precisely as the compelling state interest that
we have said may justify a measured intrusion on constitutional
rights.3
21
Justice O'Connor opined that suspicionless testing swept "too
broadly and too imprecisely" and as such did not adequately serve the
compelling interest to justify curtailing students' Fourth Amendment
rights.322 So too, a balance must be struck between protecting
students from physical violence while respecting their First
Amendment rights. Strictly applied, Morse may provide such a
317. See supra text accompanying notes 234-41.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 155-90.
319. See Anne Dunton Lam, Student Threats and the First Amendment, 33 SCH. LAW BULL. 1, 10
(2002).
320. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
321. Id. at 686 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
322. Id.
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balance when read to allow schools to act "'not to punish ... but to
avert perceived potential harm. "' 32
3
Of course, schools have not only a right and a compelling interest,
but also the obligation to protect the safety of its students.324
Therefore, disciplinary action narrowly tailored to avert grave harm
"serve[s] precisely as the compelling state interest that .. .may
justify a measured intrusion on constitutional rights., 325 At the same
time, however, schools do not have the right or legitimate interest to
stop a young Stephen King or Cormac McCarthy from writing the
next critically acclaimed, albeit graphically violent and disturbing,
novel.326 Therefore, schools must respect student-speech rights and
avoid disciplinary action that merely punishes rather than protects. In
other words, whereupon a proper assessment reveals that a student's
speech does not pose a threat, schools must respect student
expression even if it may likely "inspire fear . . . or cause a





323. Frederick v. Morse, 49 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cit. 2006) (quoting LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist.,
257 F.3d 981, 983 (9th Cir. 2001)).
324. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2628 (2007).
325. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 686 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
326. Stephen King is a best-selling author of "horror" novels whose works include The Shining and
Carrie-a story about a troubled girl who eventually kills all of her classmates. Cormac McCarthy is an
award-winning and critically acclaimed author whose works include Blood Meridian and All the Pretty
Horses.
327. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
328. The author would like to acknowledge the Urban Fellows Program, which held a year-long
discussion series on education, thus providing the germination for this topic, and would also like to
thank her husband, Charles Hooker, for his unwavering support and constant source of inspiration.
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